Abstract:-In the cloud environment, the digital content accessed by the user is mostly stored in the server. Thus, it needs to prevent malicious persons from modifying information and faking the user's identity to obtain the digital content. In addition, in the cloud computing environment, it is required to consider the storage space and computing performance problems for the mobile device. In this paper, a secure and efficient NFC identity authentication and digital content protection scheme is proposed. We use an NFC tag to store the security token and other related parameters, and put the tags in a protected environment in order to prevent it from being damaged or tampered by malicious persons. Through the NFC side-channel, a user needs to near the NFC tag to access the security token. In addition, we use the challenge-response protocol and the message authentication code to achieve mutual authentication, and generate the session key to protect the transmitted digital content.
R 2 : A random number generated by the server. Lifetime i : The valid period of the i-th security token. SK: The session key shared between the NFC-enabled mobile device and the server Esk(): The symmetric encryption function using the shared key sk [6] . ||: The string concatenation operator.
A) Initialization phase
In the initialization phase, the cloud server generates the parameters and computes the security token. These parameters will be stored in NFC tag by NFC communication channel. The cloud server generates the parameters as follows: 1) The cloud server generates the parameters (x,ID i ,Lifetime i ), and computes the security token K i = h(ID i ||x||Lifetime i ).
2) The cloud server stores the parameters (x,ID i ,Lifetime i ) and stores the parameters (ID i, K i ,Lifetime i )into the NFC tag by the NFC communication channel.
B) Reading phase
In the reading phase, we assume the NFC tag is placed in a secure and protected environment. The user uses a mobile device to near the NFC tag to obtain the parameters. The user uses an NFC-enabled mobile device to near the NFC tag to obtain the parameters (ID i, K i ,Lifetime i )and store the parameters in a mobile device.
C) Authentication phase
In this phase, the user uses the parameters obtained from the NFC tag to do mutual authentication with the cloud server. The user and the server will generate their random numbers in the authentication phase, and compute the hash message authentication codes to authenticate each other. The user generates a random number R 1 , and sends (ID i ,R 1 ) to the cloud server. The cloud server uses the received ID i to compute the security token K i . The cloud server generates a random number R 2 and computes v = HMAC(K i ,R 1 ). The cloud server sends (R 2, v) to the user. The user computes v′ = HMAC(K i ,R 1 ), and checks if v′ is equal to v. If it is not equal, the user ends the authentication process. If it is equal, the user computes w = HMAC(K i ,R 2 ), and sends w to the cloud server. The cloud server computes w′ =. HMAC(K i ,R 2 ), and checks if w′ is equal to w. If it is equal, it accepts the authentication. D) Access phase In this phase, the user and the cloud server will compute the session key, and use the symmetric encryption to achieve digital content protection. When the user and the cloud server finish mutual authentication, the cloud server will compute the session key SK = h(K i || R 1 |R 2 ). The cloud server can use the session key SK to encrypt the digital content, and sends E SK [E −content] to the user. After the user receiving E SK [E −content], she/he computes the session key SK = h(K i || R 1 |R 2 ) and decrypts E SK [E −content] to obtain the digital content E − content.
IV. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A) Security analysis In this section, we will discuss the security and functionality of our proposed scheme. The security analysis consists of mutual authentication, being suitable for diverse mobile devices in cloud environment, no password table, no timesynchronization problem, preventing the replay attack, session key agreement, preventing the dictionary attack and the brute force attack, and the user's identity privacy protection. Table 1 presents the functionality comparison between our scheme and Alfredo Matos et al.'s scheme [10] . In order to prevent the attacker from faking a user to log on the server to access sensitive information, the user and the cloud server must do mutual authentication to ensure their real identities. In Section 3.3.4, after the user receives (R 2 , v) from the cloud server, the user checks that v is equal to HMAC(K i ,R 1 ) . If it is true, the user authenticates the cloud server since the authentication tag HMAC(K i ,R 1 ) is computed from the key K i shared between the cloud server and the user. In Section 3.3.5, after the cloud server receives w from the user, the cloud server computes w′and then checks that w′ is equal to HMAC(K i, R 2 ). If it is true, the cloud server authenticates the user since the authentication tag HMAC(K i ,R 2 ) is computed from the key K i shared between the user and the cloud server. use an NFC tag to store the related parameters. Thus we can reduce the cost of storage and computing to suitable for the diverse mobile devices on cloud environments. b) No password table Typically, the cloud server needed to create a password table to store the user's password for authentication. Thus, when the cloud server has a password table, it will increase the storage cost on the server's database and the risk of the insider attack. In order to prevent these problems, the cloud server does not require a password table to store the user's password in our proposed scheme since ever NFC tag can get the security token generated by the server. Thus, the cloud server and the server can use the security token to do authentication each other.
In Section 3.3, after the cloud server receives (ID,R 2 ) from the user, the cloud server computes the security token K i = h(ID i ||x||Lifetime i ) and the user can use a random number R 2 and the security token K i to compute the message authentication code and sends it to the cloud server. At this point, the cloud server can compute w′ = HMAC(K i ,R 2 ) and check if w' is equal to the w for the user identity authentication. It replaces the use of a password to verify the identity. Thus, our proposed scheme does not require a password table to store passwords.
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c) No time-synchronization problem In our proposed scheme, we use nonce to complete authentication phase since we want to avoid the timesynchronization problem. In Section, the cloud server and user generates the random number R 1 and R 2 . Then, the cloud server and user uses these random numbers and the security token K i to compute the hash message authentication codes to do the mutual authentication. Based on this operation, our proposed scheme can solve the time-synchronization problem since our proposed scheme is a nonce-based authentication scheme.
d) Preventing the replay attack In our proposed scheme, we use the challenge-response authentication method to prevent the replay attack.In Section after the cloud server receives the parameters (ID i ,R 1 ), the cloud server returns (R 2 ,HMAC(K i ,R i )) to the user. When the user verify the response HMAC(K i, R 2 )received from the cloud server, the user return the response HMAC(K i ,R 2 ), to the cloud server in Section 3.3.4. Thus when the cloud server verify the response HMAC(K i ,R 2 ), the authentication phase will completed. Based on this processes, reusing the random number R 1 and R 2 will not pass the authentication since the random number R 1 and R 2 can only be used once. Thus, our proposed scheme can prevent the replay attack. e) Session key agreement In our proposed scheme, after completing the authentication, the user and the cloud server can compute the session key SK = h(K i ||R 1 ||R 2 ) as the digital content encryption and decryption key. Every session key of the digital content will be different in a different authentication phase. In our proposed scheme, the session key SK contents the parameter h(K i ||R 1 ||R 2 ) where K i = h(ID i ||x||Lifetime i ) shared with the cloud server and the NFC tag in Initialization phase, and R 1 ,R 2 is a random number chosen by the cloud server and user in Authentication phase.
B) The communication and computation cost
In this section, we will discuss the communication, storage and computation cost of our scheme.
a) The storage cost and communication cost comparison In this section, we compare the communication cost and the storage cost. The detail comparison is illustrated in Table 2.  In  P1  of  Table  2,  our  scheme  has  the In P2 of Table 2 , our proposed scheme has the parameters (ID i ,R 1 ,R 2, HMAC(K i ,R 1 ), HMAC(K i ,R 2 )). The memory length is 32 + 64 + 64 + 128 +128 = 416 bits. Alfredo et al.'s scheme [18] has the parameters (E KAP (nounce,TS), nounce,TS)The memory length is 1024 + 64 + 32 = 1120 bits. In P3 of Table 2 , the user's device memory has the parameter SK. The memory length is 128 bits. Alfredo et al.'s scheme [18] has the parameter K AP . The memory length is 1024 bits. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a secure and efficient NFC identity authentication and digital content protection mechanism in the cloud environment. Our proposed scheme uses the NFC as a side-channel to store security token in order to ensure the physical security for the authentication. In addition, we use a challenge-response authentication mechanism to compute the hash message authentication codes to achieve the mutual authentication, and prevent the message from being forged and replayed. In our proposed scheme, the cloud server does not need a password 
